TOWER GROVE — Even by his own admission, St. Louis Cardinals first baseman Albert Pujols believes the year he didn’t win the National League MVP may have been his best year, by the numbers, so far. In 2006, Pujols said recently, he didn’t have that prolonged lull. He missed games by being on the DL, but when he was able to hit, he always hit.

All the way to the tune of career highs.

Pujols finished second in the NL MVP voting despite setting career highs for RBIs (137) and home runs (49), leading the league in runs scored (119) and slugging percentage (.671), and batting .331. He received plenty of spoils from the season, and the presence of a World Series trophy certainly made the absence of the MVP trophy easily palatable. The next season, the Cardinals scuffled and for the first time in his career he didn’t score 100 runs. Pujols finished 2007 with a career-low in RBIs (103), runs scored (99), and his lowest slugging percentage since 2002 (.568 to .561). Yet, he played in 15 more games in 2007 than he did in 2006. Why the drop?

Could be the elbow. Could have been the foot issues. The hamstring.

Or, it could have been the protection.

In 2007, the Cardinals’ cleanup hitter — as a combined entity — ranked last in batting average, on-base percentage and slugging. It was in 2007 that manager Tony La Russa began the steady drumbeat for a bigger bat to plant behind Pujols and offer his best hitter the best protection money — or prospects, whatever was handy — could buy. This past winter, La Russa’s longing eyes transfixed on Matt Holliday and the Albert Pujols Protection Plan not only had a purpose, it had a perfect fit. Yet, the notion of protection is not one that is universally accepted. The logic is strong: The better the bat behind the best bat, the better the pitches the best bat will receive. (Say that five times fast.)

About a month ago, I collected the statistics from the past six seasons so that the protection Pujols received in each year could be measured, compared … and understood.

In the last week of June, here is what the Cardinals’ combined cleanup hitter was doing:

261 AB … 30 R … 60 H … 12 HR … .230 BA … .306 OBP … .402 SLG

The batting average ranked last in the National League. The on-base percentage ranked 15th, and the slugging percentage ranked 14th. Pedestrian across the board. Toward the end of the best month of production in his career, Pujols was receiving inadequate protection, to say the least. Since, the production in the cleanup spot has improved. The addition of 20-for-33 Holliday skyrocketed the production from the No. 4 spot, and yet the spike coincides with Pujols’  “funk”, as described in today paper (the gamer, the Bernie Miklasz column).

Check out where a resurgent Ryan Ludwick and an uncanny Holliday has moved the numbers from the cleanup spot in a little more than a month:

405 AB … 55 R … 112 H … 21 HR … 81 RBI … .277 BA … .352 OBP … .489 SLG

The batting average has climbed to 11th in the NL, the on-base percentage has moved to seventh, and that slugging percentage has leapfrogged all the way to eighth. Ludwick, for his efforts, has a .517 slugging percentage in cleanup spot. But even he saw what the benefit of putting a known bat into the Albert Pujols Protection Plan.

“He’s got the name,” Ludwick told me the day the Cardinals acquired Holliday from Oakland. “He’s done it for a couple years. He’s a bona fide, known consistent hitter.”

The theory of protecting a batter was mentioned in this week’s Sports Illustrated, and Joe Sheehan, who doubles as a lead writer over at Baseball Prospectus, puts succinctly in the SI article about Holliday: “Statistical studies dating back 30 years have show that protection doesn’t exist.” Three years ago the topic was discussed in BP’s Baseball Between the Numbers, edited by Jonah Keri, the Keeper of the Youppi Flame. In an essay loosely based around Billy Martin pulling his lineup out of a hat, literally, the church of protection is questioned, even debunked.

Writes James Click in that essay: “Protection is overrated.”

An anecdotal check of this season for Pujols would seem to support that. No protection, he has the June of his life. “Protected” and he slinks into a slump. There are obviously mitigating factors when you deal in small sample sizes like a season. So, it’s back to the season numbers. In 2002, the hitter who batted cleanup most posted a .578 slugging percentage. That was Pujols. Since Pujols has graduated to the No. 3 spot in the order, the highest slugging percentage from the cleanup spot combined was .569 in 2003. (Jim Edmonds slugged .624 in 250 at-bats at No. 4 that season.) In 2003, Pujols won a batting title (.359) and led the league in runs, hits and doubles. He drove in 124 runs, scored 137 of them and hit 43 homers. It was, a standard, metronome-like Pujolsian year and his first with more than 40 homers.

Here is the protection Pujols has received in each year since he moved to No. 3 (with league rank in parentheses):

2003: 127 R … 37 HR … 112 RBI … .301 (6th)/.396 (4th)/.569 (2nd)

* Pujols … .359 BA, .667 SLG … 43 HR … 124 RBI

2004: 121 R … 35 HR … 122 RBI … .286 (7th)/.402 (2nd)/.543 (4th)

* Pujols … .331 BA, .657 SLG … 46 HR … 123 RBI

2005: 100 R … 29 HR … 104 RBI … .274 (8th)/.376 (4th)/.494 (6th)

* Pujols … .330 BA, .609 SLG .. 41 HR … 117 RBI

2006:103 R … 26 HR … 106 RBI … .308 (2nd)/.389 (5th)/.521 (8th)

* Pujols … .331 BA, .671 SLG … 49 HR … 137 RBI

2007: 77 R … 20 HR … 103 RBI … .246 (16th)/.320 (16th)/.386 (16th)

* Pujols … .327 BA, .568 SLG … 32 HR … 103 RBI

2008: 102 R … 34 HR … 113 RBI … .266 (12th)/.341 (13th)/.494 (7th)

* Pujols … .357 BA, .653 SLG … 37 HR … 116 RBI

The rise and fall of Pujols’ production does follow, somewhat, the rise and fall of his protection. In 2006, it was Scott Rolen who hit most at No. 4, and he hit .292 and slugged .513. In 2007, it was Edmonds that handled No. 4 most often and the center fielder struggled to a .230/.299/.387 batting slash line in the cleanup spot.

The question about protection making Pujols better, however, isn’t the correct question. Does protection make Pujols a better Pujols, or really doesn’t protecting Pujols maximize how he makes a better Cardinals?

The latter seems to be the case. Colleague and Hall of Fame baseball writer Rick Hummel dropped a fantastic stat on the masses yesterday. Entering Sunday’s game, Pujols had reached base 14 times during the Holliday Era and 13 times Holliday had followed by also reaching base. When it comes to protecting Pujols and his numbers, the revealing stat isn’t his average, isn’t his homers, isn’t his intentional walks and it is only slightly the nebulous idea of the pitches he gets to hit.

It’s the runs.

As mentioned at the very top of this article, the year Pujols didn’t score 100 runs was the year the Cardinals didn’t have much protection for him. The truism of the Albert Pujols Protection Plan is that Pujols reaches base a lot, regardless of who is hitting behind him. But, with the exception of the 40 or so times he hits a home run, whether he comes around to score depends entirely on the guy(s) behind him. It’s not protecting Pujols that comes from having thunder at cleanup, it’s scoring Pujols.

There is plenty to support the validity of the protection theory, not the least of which is the idea that it forces the opponent to pause when walking Pujols. We see that often. But the raw numbers show that protecting Pujols isn’t about making it more possible for him to get on base.

It’s making the most of when he is on base.

-30-