In the Defense budget, vampire slayers missed a few
Steve McDonald working on an F/A-18 Super Hornet nose barrel at Boeing-St. Louis in 2003. (Post-Dispatch/Gabriel B. Tait)
Sen. John McCain said last week that expensive Pentagon weapons systems “are very much like vampires. You can kill one occasionally, but not very often.”
The weapon that inspired the Arizona Republican’s remark was Boeing’s C-17 Globemaster III cargo plane, which he has been trying to kill for several years.
This year, Mr. McCain had the support of the Obama administration, which said the United States already has 205 C-17s and doesn’t need any more, and the Air Force itself, which said it would rather spend its money on fighter planes. But the vampire lives.
Both the Senate and House versions of the 2010 Defense appropriations bill (already months overdue) contain money for more of the $220 million airplanes — three more in the House bill and 10 more in the Senate bill. The two bills must be reconciled by a conference committee before the $636 billion bill goes to President Barack Obama for his signature, and the higher number probably will prevail.
Reason: jobs. Some 33,000 workers in 44 states work on the C-17 program, including 900 at Boeing’s plant in St. Louis. Ten more C-17s will cost $2.5 billion and save 33,000 jobs. Think of it as stimulus spending of $75,757 per job. The planes are a bonus.
Boeing-St. Louis got another nice piece of business in the Senate version of the defense bill: $512 million for nine more F/A-18 Super Hornet fighters than Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates had requested. Some 5,000 St. Louisans work on the Super Hornet line.
There’s a far better military case to be made for the F/A-18s than for the C-17. They are versatile aircraft that can fill a gap in the Naval air operations until the Navy’s version of Lockheed-Martin’s troubled F-35 Joint Strike Fighter can come on line.
Indeed, one potential choke-point in House-Senate negotiations over the final defense budget is over a $493 million appropriation for a “back-up” engine for the F-35. Some $1.7 billion already has been spent on developing the alternative engine. This, too, is about jobs, not military necessity.
The primary engine is built in Connecticut by Pratt & Whitney. The Pentagon says the back-up isn’t necessary, but lawmakers from Ohio and Indiana — where General Electric and Rolls-Royce are working on the alternate engine — want a piece of the action.
The whole idea of the F-35 was that it would be cheaper to build one plane for all branches of the service, with most of its parts interchangeable. That idea can’t survive Congress.
Another possible choke point: The Senate scrapped the long overdue, heavily over budget VH-71 helicopter, designed to replace the fleet of “Marine One” helicopters. Mr. Obama says the helicopters that he’s got now work just fine; Mr. Gates has mocked the VH-71 (now priced at about $500 million each) for allowing the president to “cook dinner in flight while under nuclear attack.”
But key House members say starting from scratch would cost even more in the long run, so the program should be modified, not scrapped. Needless to say, they represent helicopter-building districts.
Whenever he signs it, Mr. Obama’s first defense budget — which includes spending for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — will have killed at least two unnecessary weapons systems — the F-22 Raptor fighter and the Army’s Future Combat Systems program. Maybe you just have to pick off vampires a couple at a time.
Mr. Gates has mocked the VH-71 (now priced at about $500 million each) for allowing the president to “cook dinner in flight while under nuclear attack.”
False Claim!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
…”493 million appropriation for a “back-up” engine for the F-35. Some $1.7 billion already has been spent on developing the alternative engine. This, too, is about jobs, not military necessity…”
Actually the alternate engine was more about what was briefed to F-35 partner nations since the program started up until now. All the briefings showed engine choice as some assumed value in the F-35 program. The only reason the F-35 engine is being thrown out is because the F-35 program almost busted Nunn-McCurdy and had to throw out something.
At any rate, the F-35 flight test program is so far behind as to be scary. Lots of talk in the locker room with little to show out on the playing field. It is behind schedule, over cost and since there is little flight testing, a real unknown quantity on ability.
Maybe we should scrap some of them and build / buy new ones. We could call it something like… “cash for clunkers”.
You say:
“There’s a far better military case to be made for the F/A-18s than for the C-17. They are versatile aircraft that can fill a gap in the Naval air operations until the Navy’s version of Lockheed-Martin’s troubled F-35 Joint Strike Fighter can come on line.” Based on what logic? F/A-18 is a naval/marine fighter/attack craft, the bulk of which are flown from carriers and constitute a large part of fleet defense while simultaneously tasked with offensive operations. Since when did strategic/tactical airlift aircraft tasked with hypercritical in-theater ground and air force supply chain logistics support fall into the same category as a Super-Hornet?
Since so many editorials are containing C-17 catch phrases like “unnecessary”, “not requested”, “The Air Force says 205 is enough”, can I assume that you’ve fact checked the basis for such comments? Assuming you have the room, the following observations may add to your knowledge base relative to this superlative, and quite necessary, airlifter which has no true near, mid or long term replacement:
Global HeavyLift Holdings, LLC, a Florida incorporated, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan based Defense Logistics Agency listed (www.ccr.gov) entity has stated publicly and often, the data to which the SECDEF, the SECAF and others have referred to as reasons for termination of C-17 production, have been debunked as based on flawed analytics and inapplicable, outdated, conflict assumptions by the GAO and Congress, or do not exist. They can only be referring to the 2005/2006 Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) produced by the Pentagon Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) and the Strategic airlift section of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review(QDR) which echoes MCS conclusions that “180 C-17s augmented by 112 REAMP/RERP C-5s was enough”.
In defense of what seems to be a dichotomy of that which is publicly stated and actual airlift requirements, the AF was pretty much hamstrung and stuck with the C-5s, which the service desperately wanted to get rid of, thanks to behind the scenes maneuvering (well, that’s the way of the Beltway, right?) resulting in a 2004 Congressional Mandate authored by Sens. Kennedy and Biden that prevented retirement of any models save for those 14 AC that were absolutely beyond repair.
Being part, for nearly a decade, of an industry/government team which included National Security strategist Dr. Sheila R. Ronis, (a valued member of the Project on National Security ReformPNSR.org, tasked with rewriting the 1947 National Security Act), that helped restructure the original CAMAA (Commercial Application of Military Airlift Aircraft) program, the comments of a very upset AF General were relayed to me the day the mandate was implemented: “We keep trying to push these aircraft [C-5s] out the back door, and they [Congress and LMCO] keep pushing them in the front door. From this point on, it’s going to be damned difficult to get C-17s at the levels we need them (at least 222, with 300+ quite usable).”
I should also note that Dr. Ronis and I were privileged to work with former SECAF Dr. James Roche who tasked us with crafting what we felt would be a more readily implementable CAMAA strategy in the form of a white paper linked below.
http://www.slideshare.net/GHHLLC/ghhsecafroche-the-grand-strategy13-presentation
http://commercial_application_of_military_airlift_aircraft.totallyexplained.com/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commercial_Application_of_Military_Airlift_Aircraft
The General mentioned above was of course, quite correct; it has been a yearly struggle to keep the C-17 Long Beach line open. And because the existence and continuance of C-17 is so vital to our implementation of a US/NATO-controlled Heavy and Outsized industry utilizing modestly, very modestly, modified Globemasters designated BC-17, we have worked diligently to maintain its production as the following releases from this year, following the April announcement by Dr. Gates of DoD intent to end production, demonstrate:
Current: 10/09
http://www.slideshare.net/GHHLLC/global-heavylift-holdings-llc-internal-dod-analyses-referenced-in-bid-to-kill-boeing-c17-nonexistent
May/October 2009
http://www.slideshare.net/GHHLLC2/global-heavylift-states-c17-production-must-be-maintained-to-seek-faa-bc17-exemption-separate-from-boeingcontinues-pursuit-of-usd184b-capital-raise-to-implement-usnatocontrolled-heavy-and-outsized-air-cargo-industry-based-on-wellproven-airlifter
http://www.slideshare.net/GHHLLC/global-heavylift-holdings-llc-submits-rfp-to-boeing-for-ten-7478f-freighters
http://www.slideshare.net/GHHLLC/global-heavylift-holdings-llc-pushes-120-boeing-c17s-for-20102020-budgets
http://www.slideshare.net/GHHLLC/global-heavylift-holdings-llc-provides-copy-of-publicly-unavailable-dept-of-commerce-boeing-c17-industrial-base-impact-study
http://www.slideshare.net/guestde926c4/global-heavylift-holdingsllc-cites-absolute-need-for-commercial-boeing-c17-bc17based-permanent-air-augmentation-of-us-industrial-base-global-supply-chain-notes-chinas-virtual-control-of-oceanborne-shipping-and-rise-as-naval-power
May 2007 Jonathan Club Presentation
http://www.slideshare.net/GHHLLC/speed-news-aerospace-and-defense-conference-an-usnato-controlled-heavylift-industry-utilizing-boeing-bc17-globemaster-iii-commericalmilitary-airlifters
Puzzling Behavior
The arguments presented by C-17 antagonists have at best been puzzling to us and most certainly to Boeing, since we know there is no basis whatsoever for their assertions of “we have enough C-17s and buying more is a waste of money, epitomizes ‘pork barrel’ spending and is a poster child for the extremes of earmarks.”
Nothing is further from the truth, and we openly challenge our colleagues both within government and those who represent the private sector cheering section calling for the demise of this indispensable airlifter, currently flying at over 159% of mission utilization projections, to produce the data to support their arguments. It is not enough to say “planes the AF did not request or need”, “unwanted C-17s”, or, “The SECAF says they have more than enough to handle even worst case scenarios”. No, one must be able to support such contentions, and we must not forget the DoD spends 10s of millions to contract Russian/Ukrainian owned An-124s to make up for in-theater strategic airlift shortfalls. So much for “we have enough”…
Short story? The data do not exist to support C-17 termination.
Also, we have to marvel at the lengths certain colleagues in the private sector constituting elements of what we believe to be an “intellectual” assault on C-17, are willing to go in demanding the end of this aircraft. This, in the form of specious, if not fallacious, claims relative to C-17 cost which one think-tank claimed was USD376 million (included per plane development costs; an atypical publicly stated cost representation that goes beyond the disingenuous), another organization, 276 milliion. The AF gets them according to Boeing and the service itself, for 200 million or soon, even less, as Boeing Long Beach administrative and production personnel become more efficient everyday through the process of continuous improvement. Economies of scale will reduce costs even further, thereby reinforcing the wisdom of a multi-year buy(2010-2020) for 120+ C-17s.
And then, there are those who make an “apples to oranges” comparison of retrofitted C-5s versus new C-17, citing “USD81 million for the larger capacity (120 ton) Galaxy as opposed to 200 million for the smaller (87 ton) Globemaster III. As recently noted in an Aviation Week piece by Amy Butler, the comparative numbers presented in response to a clearly planted question, taken at face value, would cause any reasonable person to conclude that support of C-17 would justify an immediate psychiatric examination. That is, up until the moment they are gobsmacked by the operational realities of Iraq and especially Afghanistan: C-5s require significant infrastructure, and as a colleague said “There ain’t a lot of that in Afghanistan.”
Their operation, large targets they are and not likely to be missed by even the most incompetent of attacking enemy fighter pilots, also requires control of the air in the battlespace (ask any driver what ship they’d like to be in, C-5 vs C-17, in a chance encounter with a Mig-35. Some may also remember Tom Clancy’s treatment in his book World War III of troop-laden C-5s encountering armed Russian bombers) .
Indeed, C-17, owing to its extraordinary ability to operate on underprepared, even unprepared, runways as long as it’s flat or near flat, earth (the proposed C-17B is designed to land in mud or beach sand) in austere in-theater locales makes it the indispensable, life-saving, battle winning, strategic/tactical airlifter it has proven to be. In Air Force tests, it has landed and taken off with 22 tons aboard in distances less than 1350′.
Its amazing performances, whether humanitarian/disaster relief or conflict support missions, caused me to remark in a presentation some years ago, “The only way the DoD could do better relative to a mission capable aircraft is to introduce a 489 knot, 2500 nautical mile range Sikorsky Skycrane with 87 ton capacity. To be sure, comparing C-17 to C-5, An-124 or B-747 is like comparing Fat Albert (the Cosby character) to Michael Jordan.”
Most importantly, C-17 is the ideal, if not perfect, airlift platform for addressing the potential of conventional and asymmetric warfare existing concomitantly, along with an observable increase in the frequency of disaster/humanitarian relief scenarios. This reality dictates need for an ability to rapidly project significant force in a way that acknowledges the comfortable bi-polarity of the Cold War has been replaced by the dangers and unpredictability of a militarily/economically emergent China, a nuclear armed Iran, the traditional uncertainties associated with North Korea’s beligerence and terrorist organizations possessed of global reach.
We will state, and will continue to state, our firm belief that the continuous and intense efforts to kill Boeing C-17 — we are in full expectation of at least one last effort to remove funding for the additional 10 AC from the 2010 Budget — are directly the result of a desire by involved parties to ensure retrofit all remaining C-5s and introduce the yet-to-fly Airbus/EADS A400M 37 ton capacity turboprop tactical airlifter into USAF inventories… both aspirations requiring the demise of C-17, and perhaps, Boeing itself.
It goes without saying that the loss of the country’s last wide body airlifter production line and its product will have critical, long lasting and perhaps unrecoverable negative economic, national security and industrial base/defense industrial base cohesiveness and viability implications; contentions supported in the officially unavailable 2005 Department of Commerce Study “National Security Assessment of the C-17 Globemaster Cargo Aircraft’s Economic and Industrial Base Impacts”.
http://www.emotionreports.com/downloads/pdfs/GHHDOC_C17_2005.pdf
We strongly recommend review of this very important document by our, with all due respect, underinformed colleagues who, by their public comments such as “Don’t Waste Money Buying More C-17s”, have yet to grasp that the defense industrial base and the industrial base are one and the same, symbiotic, inseparable and inextricably linked. They would also do well to take a refresher course in Keynesian economics.
Lastly, we believe that we have addressed the ultimate conversation stopper when it comes to annual funding of new or existing DoD programs, which is “is there money in the budget?”. The process is called Transformational Recapitalization” and as articulated by Dr. Ronis in the November/December 2004 issue of Defense AT&L, will forever change the DoD acquisition process by allowing the AF to resell in-fleet aircraft to commercial (airlifters, tankers) and military customers (fighters, bombers, tankers) when 50% of service life is reached. The funds derived from this actvity will flow back into the budget (requiring a change in scoring law) thus recapitalizing it, and then used to place new orders.
Another core element of Trans-Recap calls for the slowing down of assembly lines rather than building the contracted AC as fast as possible. This allows upgrades in avionics and weapons systems to be incorporated while in production, thus precluding the necessity and costs of a complete retrofit 15 to 30 years later. This way, the service is always operating new or fully upgraded aircraft at all times, and when sold to NATO aillies at their half-life, will create new levels of operational readiness and interoperability.
http://www.dau.mil/documents/publications/dam/11_12_2004/rons-nd04.pdf
In light of the above, Jonathan Harker may well have concluded regarding the “vampiric” C-17, “Garlic and stakes are unnecessary in this instance.”
Nevertheless, we appreciate the observations of the editorial board in trying to add substance to what has become chaotic, non-solutions oriented, discussion.
Myron D. Stokes
Managing Member
Global HeavyLift Holdings, LLC
74 W. Long Lake Rd.
Suite 103
Bloomfield Hills, MI
48304
Defense Logistics Agency listed
http://www.ccr.gov
http://www.emotionreports.com
email: globalheavyliftholdings at ymail.com
About Global HeavyLift Holdings, LLC:
Founded in 2002, GHH is a strategic air transport solutions entity that was born of a multi-year public/private effort among forward thinkers in both the private sector and government to mitigate emerging and observable vulnerabilities in the U.S. industrial base global supply chain. Such vulnerabilities are represented by the fact that no ocean-borne shipping is in U.S. hands at present, thus potentially subjecting American corporations, especially automotive, and their global operations to the whims and perhaps economically hostile activities of and by foreign governments. Add to this the risk of terrorist activities, which have, according to the Department of Homeland Security, targeted maritime operations; i.e., ships, ports and ocean containers.
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) listed, it is the goal of GHH and its strategic partners around the planet to work with key logistics personnel within these corporations and government agencies to conceptualize, craft and structure long-term global supply chain alternative transportation methodologies through continuous — not stop gap or emergency — air augmentation solutions. Its most important mission, however, has been in the co-development of global architecture for infrastructure of a new American controlled industry, Heavylift, utilizing the excellent airlift performance characteristics of the Boeing BC-17.
This is Jeff DeMarrais from GE. With all due respect to the author of this post, this is only half the story.
For 14 years Congress has supported a second engine for the Joint Strike Fighter because there is a strong belief that it will SAVE money (http://tinyurl.com/y9duqsl)by encouraging competition between manufacturers and result in a more reliable engine for our men and women serving in the military. (http://www.f136.com)
The “primary” Pratt & Whitney engine is already ~$2B over budget(http://tinyurl.com/ycf9a6b) - GE and Rolls Royce are willing to take on the cost risk with a fixed-price approach.
That is why competition, not a $100B, single-sourced program, is required to slay the real vampire - defense spending without acquisition reform.