The U.S. Supreme Court ruled Wednesday that church-employed workers who perform religious duties are not protected under federal discrimination laws.

The decision, based in the First Amendment, came in the case of a Michigan woman who was fired in 2005 from a teaching position at Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School.

She claimed she had been discriminated against following an extended medical leave; in the months she was out, the school had hired another instructor and did not have a place for her upon her return nearly seven months later.

The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed.

A selection from the Court document summarizes the ruling:

Since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964and other employment discrimination laws, the Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized the existence of a "ministerial exception," grounded in the First Amendment, that precludes application of such legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers. The Court agrees that there is such a ministerial exception.

Requiring a church to accept orretain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to doso, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs.

By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments. According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.

Teacher Cheryl Perich and her attorneys argued that ministerial exception did not apply in her case because the majority of her work day was spent teaching secular classes, such as social studies, gym, art and music, similar to other "lay" or "contract" teachers at her school.

However, during her earlier years of employment, Perich had undergone substantial ministerial training and certification. Twice a year, she also lead school-wide religious services on site in addition to daily in-class devotionals.

Enough evidence indicated that for all intents and purposes, Perich was, in fact, a minister, the Court said.

The ruling, however, did not outline nor put into practice "a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister."

That evoked the most interesting point, for me, of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.'s opinion: "The issue before us ... is not one that can be resolved by a stopwatch."

In other words, while it was significant that most days Perich may have only spent 45 minutes dedicated to "ministerial work," 45 minutes is still 45 minutes and a minister is a minister.

There are no time clocks and punch cards when you're called to the work.

Interesting. What's your take?