It has been said that Winston Churchill's book about the First World War was a fragment of autobiography in the guise of a history of that war. So, too, this account of the recent history of "the holy land," the area of the old British Palestine mandate.

"We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land" is former President Jimmy Carter's memoir of his work toward an Arab-Israeli peace, wrapped up in historical narrative. The actions of the men on the spot — Arafat, Begin, Barak, Abbas and others — are told as episodes in the labors of the author.

Carter claims the lead role in working for peace. The book has more than 200 pages; Carter appears on page 11 and dominates the text thereafter. The first portion of the book leads up to the historic agreement between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin during Carter's presidency, cemented by agreements made at Camp David in 1978 and '79.

Carter's account tends to minimize the remarkable events that took place in the Middle East (such as Sadat's historic journey to Jerusalem) and emphasizes the negotiations in our country. We then move forward over the next 25 years, as the promise of a complete peace agreement in the 1970s fails.

Carter carefully discusses the intricate maneuvering through the administrations that followed his, concluding that peace is possible, yet elusive.

The history as told here is one-sided. The efforts of the two Bushes and especially of President Bill Clinton are rather curtly told. The diligent and very nearly successful negotiations that Clinton labored over get less notice and much less praise than other commentators have given him. (Apparently, being a fellow Democrat gets you no merit in this book.)

This is not evidently just a matter of competitive credit-seeking; Clinton has remarked that at crucial moments, Yasser Arafat, then chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, could not be counted on.

Carter sees things differently. In this book, Arafat and almost all the other Arab leaders are gracious, hospitable and peace-seeking, while most Israeli politicians (Shimon Peres notably excepted) are cold, often unyielding and unsympathetic. Carter repeats Rita Hauser's remark that "Jews were very puzzled by Carter — he was not a man to whom there would be a natural attraction." It would seem that, at least in respect to Israelis, the lack of rapport was mutual.

It is unfortunate that this attitude is still evident, even as this book is explicitly intended as an explanation and softening of the effect of Carter's earlier book, "Palestine: Peace not Apartheid." Looking back, he admits that using the word "apartheid" was "highly controversial." In this, book, that explosive word is not repeated.

Carter ends this short book with a sensible proposal for a peace treaty, based on the idea of trading land for peace. The feelings of the author, so rooted in his proverbial optimism and constant regard for those he considers underdogs, is often at odds with his intelligent analysis of facts as they developed. With Jimmy Carter, it is sympathy that wins out.

Joseph Losos is a St. Louis investment adviser.